In current dairy farming it is possible to run a profitable farm without having to adapt the system to the needs of dairy cows. In such systems the interests of the farmer and animals often diverge. Consequently, specific animal welfare problems occur. Foot disorders in dairy cattle are an illustrative example resulting from the specific methods of housing and management in current dairy farming. Foot disorders and the resulting lameness are considered the most important welfare problem in dairy farming. However, (...) these foot disorders not only typify welfare problems related to certain housing systems, but they also lead to the premature culling of cows. The assessment of the impact of foot disorders on the welfare of dairy cows raised the question of whether premature culling affects animal welfare since it affects the longevity of a cow. We argue that this aspect of longevity is morally relevant as an animal welfare issue. In this paper we aim to explore whether longevity is both (a) a morally relevant aspect in the discussion on killing animals and (b) a constitutive element of animal welfare. In other words, we aim to explore whether longevity is an independent moral argument in an animal welfare discussion. We claim that longevity is not merely important as an indicator of animal welfare, but is also a constitutive element of animal welfare. We argue that we need a more integrated approach to animal welfare and that an assessment that includes the aspect of time is necessary. This view involves a shift from views on animal welfare in terms of functioning or feeling well to a view on animal welfare that includes the aspect of natural living in which species-specific development is important. To show the impact of these points of view, we look at the practical implications for choices concerning the management of foot disorders in dairy cattle. (shrink)

This posthumous and unfinished book by the author of The Revolt of the Masses is in the continental tradition of philosophy as literature. The theme of this historical and etymological essay is the justification of that tradition. Ortega's writing is graceful, and includes aphorisms intended to evoke in the reader the philosophical frame of mind, and a sense of wonder. He finds that philosophy so far has provided no system which is adequately true for us; it is dialectical, revealing the (...) past as a defunct world of errors, which are at the same time involuntary instruments of future truth.. In ancient Greece man first felt an excess of possibilities over needs, both in economics and in explanation. The consequent necessity to choose brought about the phenomenon of rationalism. The means of choosing constitutes method. Science and theology thus emerge in Greece as secondary speculations on primary poetic-mythological explanations. In chapters on Parmenides and Heraclitus, Ortega analyzes the style of each, and illustrates his views on the relation between style and the growth of philosophy. His tool here he calls "etymology," although to those trained in the Anglo-American tradition, his word-analysis is more lyrical than analytic. He concludes that Heraclitus used the oracular or sibylline formula for expressing universal wisdom, and that this in fact is philosophy's most suitable vehicle of expression.—M. B. M. (shrink)

This penetrating book sheds light on the psychology of fundamentalism, with a particular focus on those who become extremists and fanatics. What accounts for the violence that emerges among some fundamentalist groups? The contributors to this book identify several factors: a radical dualism, in which all aspects of life are bluntly categorized as either good or evil; a destructive inclination to interpret authoritative texts, laws, and teachings in the most literal of terms; an extreme and totalized conversion experience; paranoid thinking; (...) and an apocalyptic world view. After examining each of these concepts in detail, and showing the ways in which they lead to violence among widely disparate groups, these engrossing essays explore such areas as fundamentalism in the American experience and among jihadists, and they illuminate aspects of the same psychology that contributed to such historical crises as the French Revolution, the Nazi movement, and post-Partition Hindu religious practice. (shrink)

The problem we are discussing has many aspects.

It has long become established practice, on the part of the editors of Voprosy filosofii, to hold round table discussions on various pressing problems of philosophy and related disciplines.

Profound revolutionary changes occur periodically in the historical development of science. They take place when the system of scientific views previously in existence breaks down, and a new system adequate to the higher level of scientific knowledge takes shape. The discoveries of Copernicus, Lavoisier, Darwin, and many others have opened such periods of change in natural science. In modern physics, the discoveries of radium and the electron, the emergence of the theory of relativity and of quantum mechanics, have brought about (...) a revolution which has not yet run its course. (shrink)

The subject of the present paper is the central conception of a philosophy that has been particularly dominant and influential, and the following remarks are prompted because of difficulties experienced in the attempt to understand that philosophy. The aim of the paper is to point out what seems to be a serious defect in that type of philosophy; but it is even more its aim to emphasize the danger into which philosophy in all its forms may easily fall, and against (...) which it must exercise precautions. (shrink)

Given current constraints on universal treatment campaigns, recent advances in public health prevention initiatives have revitalized efforts to stem the tide of HIV transmission. Yet, despite a growing imperative for prevention—supported by the promise of behavioral, structural and biomedical approaches to lower the incidence of HIV—human rights frameworks remain limited in addressing collective prevention policy through global health governance. Assessing the evolution of rights-based approaches to global HIV/AIDS policy, this review finds that human rights have shifted from collective public health (...) to individual treatment access. While the advent of the HIV/AIDS pandemic gave meaning to rights in framing global health policy, the application of rights in treatment access litigation came at the expense of public health prevention efforts. Where the human rights framework remains limited to individual rights enforced against a state duty bearer, such rights have faced constrained application in framing population-level policy to realize the public good of HIV prevention. Concluding that human rights frameworks must be developed to reflect the complementarity of individual treatment and collective prevention, this article conceptualizes collective rights to public health, structuring collective combination prevention to alleviate limitations on individual rights frameworks and frame rights-based global HIV/AIDS policy to assure research expansion, prevention access and health system integration. (shrink)

In Alfred Ayer's article, philosophy is sharply counterposed to science, is denied the status of a science. This is the leitmotif of his entire paper. Moreover, the defense of this conception is characteristic of many representatives of neopositivism who go along with Ayer. However, Ayer has certain distinctive ideas of his own, which require critical analysis. Fundamental among them is his acknowledgment of the extremely general character of the concepts and principles with which philosophy, as distinct from the special sciences, (...) operates. This universality which is the distinguishing characteristic of philosophy is then transformed into an argument against the recognition of philosophy as a science. In replying to Ayer we shall attempt to demonstrate that his acknowledgment by no means necessitates the elimination of philosophy from the list of the sciences, but merely emphasizes its distinctive, that is, its general character, in contrast to all other sciences, which are particular in nature. This is the theme of the present article. (shrink)

v. 1. Philosophie. Rechtsphilosophie -- v. 2-4. Volkenrecht -- v. 5-6. Rechtsgeschiedenis. Burgerlijk recht. Procesrecht. Octrooirecht. Studie.

Philosophers and natural scientists are both familiar with the fact that, nearly a century ago, Engels undertook to synthesize the findings of natural science in his day from the standpoint of materialist dialectics. But few know the price Engels paid, how many times the work approached completion but was, for various reasons, postponed again and again until his death. In his mind, what place was his Dialectics of Nature to have occupied in the overall system of Marxist theory? This is (...) the question to which I devote the present article. But before offering an answer, it is necessary to trace, albeit briefly, the history of this book — how it was conceived by Engels, how work on it progressed, how it was broken off, and how the incomplete manuscript came down to us. (shrink)

The question of a new journal and the philosophical debate of 1947 In 1922-43 Soviet philosophers had their own journal titled Pod znamenem marksizma [Under the Banner of Marxism]. It came into being in early 1922 and its third issue contained Lenin's programmatic article "On the Significance of Militant Materialism" [O znachenii voinstvuiushchego materializma]. This journal published many good combative articles in its twenty years. But during the War it fell ill and in mid-1943 ceased to exist. It was not (...) discontinued. No, it simply lacked the strength to appear. Thereafter, we Soviet philosophers did not have our own journal for several years. The lack was felt especially keenly after the end of the Great Patriotic War when philosophical studies developed quickly in our country. A wide discussion of philosophical questions, especially contentious, controversial questions—and there were quite a few of them—became necessary but there was no forum for discussing them. This was also true of the critical analysis of the philosophical literature that was coming out: a rare review appeared from time to time in the existing journals, but it was clearly inadequate and, most importantly, it did not give a comprehensive evaluation of the merits and shortcomings of the published philosophical work. It seemed to us then that an unhealthy situation such as the one involving G. F. Aleksandrov's book The History of Western European Philosophy [Istoriia zapadnoevropeiskoi filosofii], which was not evaluated on its merits and, despite its serious flaws, was praised by admirers of the author's talent, could only arise in the absence of a philosophical journal. Had there been a journal, it could have helped to prevent such stuffy situations from arising in certain sections of the philosophical front. Obviously, this opinion was quite naive: at the time many of us did not understand that if Aleksandrov had had "his" man on the journal, no criticism of his book would have been permitted. We realized this later. (shrink)

The question of the unity of scientific knowledge, including that of the unity of the natural sciences and the humanities , occupies an important place in the writings of Marx. As a consistent materialist, Marx demonstrated that the connection among the sciences was based on an objective connection among the phenomena of nature and society. This outlook provides the key to discovering the unity of the sciences in our own day. Let us see how Marx posed that question, and how (...) it stands today. (shrink)

There can be no doubt that the process of differentiation of the sciences today is going forward with rising intensity. This process is expressed in two ways: in the appearance of new sciences and disciplines outside those already existing, and as the further subdivision of existing sciences into narrower and more fragmented disciplinary branches.

1. As always, before beginning a discussion it is necessary to settle on the concepts with which one will operate. In the present instance we will be concerned not only with the concept of determinism, but with others associated with or correlative to it: law, causality, necessity, etc. Obviously, within the limits of a brief paper we can deal only with the most basic features.